Handke and Towse (2007)
Contents
Source Details
Handke and Towse (2007) | |
Title: | Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies |
Author(s): | Handke, C., Towse, R. |
Year: | 2007 |
Citation: | Handke, Christian, and Ruth Towse. Economics of copyright collecting societies. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 38.8 (2007): 937-957. |
Link(s): | Definitive , Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: | Kretschmer (2011), Towse (2017) |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | This study is a literature review of 40 studies examining the role of copyright collecting societies, including 2 reports from the European Commission. |
Data Type: | Secondary data |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | Yes |
Government or policy study?: | Yes |
Time Period(s) of Collection: |
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Funder(s): |
Abstract
Economists have long recognised that copyright collecting societies (CCS), i.e. organisations that specialise on administering "copyrights held by a large number of owners", play a fundamental role in the copyright system. Indeed, the economic literature explains why without such organisations, copyright law would be ineffective in some markets for copyrighted works: the majority of authors and users would not be able to grant or obtain permission to use many works of art, literature, music, film and other such works that copyright law protects. In economic terms, CCS enable markets to function for the use of copyright works in situations in which the copyright holder cannot contract directly with the user. But because many markets for copyright works have changed rapidly over recent years, we should ask under which circumstances CCS would continue to play a constructive, maybe even essential, role. It has been argued many times that technical solutions to digital rights management (DRM) will render CCS obsolete as the market for copyrights shifts online and policy-makers such as the European Commission have begun to scrutinise the role played by CCS in the dynamic market for copyrighted media content online (REC 2005/737/EC). The purpose of this survey of the specialised economic literature is to take stock and to identify possible gaps in the understanding of the economics of CCS and to advocate attention to this literature in contemporary debates about them.
Main Results of the Study
- Collecting societies are an efficient way of distributing remittances for copyright to artists by minimising individual transaction costs* Collecting societies tend to operate as a monopoly or a bilateral monopoly but despite this the pricing of content licenses tends to be set at a point chosen by the market* Digital Rights Management may be able to take over some of the functions of collecting agencies in the future* Various for-profit organisations seek to enter the market of collecting license fees but despite increasing competition this is unlikely to result in fairer pricing
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- Collecting societies tend to operate as monopolies; despite this they seem to operate efficiently within the market in terms of minimising transaction costs and setting a fair price point * Blanket licensing is common to most collecting societies but is less efficient as it does not take into account the higher price that could be set for more popular content * Technological advances may allow Digital Rights Management to take over some of the functions of collecting societies in future * There may be cause for further regulation to incorporate technological advances such as downloading
Coverage of Study
Datasets
Sample size: | 1 |
Level of aggregation: | case study |
Period of material under study: | 1975 to 2007 |